Synthesis of the results of the field surveys completed during Household Economy Analysis Training Programme for the Sahel Workshop held 19-22 July 2011 in Niamey

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1. Introduction
From June 2010 SCUK undertook a major programme of capacity building for livelihoods and food security analysis in the Sahel region, with funding from ECHO and technical assistance from the Food Economy Group. Thirty-two participants for six Sahel countries\(^1\) were given a practical training in the processes of Household Economy Analysis (HEA). Up to June 2011 the steps were:

- understanding the HEA approach and the analytical framework;
- acquiring the skills of the fieldwork method through participation in several livelihood zone surveys;
- entering the field data into the customized HEA baseline storage spreadsheet; and consolidating the data in the spreadsheet to obtain a final set of values for each zone;
- writing an HEA profile of a livelihood zone on the basis of all the field Information;\(^2\)
- training in Outcome Analysis, i.e. using the data to produce results for different early warning scenarios.

The field surveys were undertaken in two areas each of Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, and in three areas of Niger. The Synthesis Workshop held July 19 to 22, 2011 was an opportunity for all the participants in the HEA capacity building programme to take an overview of the findings from their fieldwork (the workshop agenda is given in Annex 1). The aim was to train the participants to look at the data on the different zones comparatively and to think about the meaning of the information. The key was for them to keep the Household Economy analytical framework constantly in mind, and to sift through the data in the zone baseline spreadsheets and the written profiles, not forgetting their personal observations in the field, and from all the detail pick out the essential points – the ‘story’.

The first step was to establish the differences and similarities between zones; the second step was to establish the differences and similarities between wealth groups. Then in subsequent sessions the participants were asked to consider the application of the information and analysis to a) understanding food security and its relation to poverty; b) thinking of the potential contribution of the information and framework of analysis to national early warning systems (extending the ideas already explored in the Outcome Analysis training); c) thinking about development interventions; and d) informing advocacy. During the sessions the participants divided into working groups, and for each topic the groups were asked to put together a short presentation on the results their deliberations. This is part of capacity building: data only becomes information when analysed, and analysis only becomes useful if it is communicated in an intelligible way. This in turn requires the development of skills in deciding on the main elements of the subject in hand, in providing well-presented evidence (with a strong accent on selectivity and clarity), and in offering incisive conclusions or messages that the audience will remember the next day.

In this report we present the synthesis of the main data, and offer explanation of their content and discussion of their implications.

### 2. The Patterns of Livelihood

The livelihood zones surveyed in all four countries are within the settled agricultural and agro-pastoral bands in which the great majority of the rural population live in the four countries visited.\(^3\) All the zones are in the soudano-sahelian ecology as opposed to more humid guinean ecology in the far south of the countries. Some of the zones are more arid than others, and this principally makes the difference between agro-pastoral and agricultural economies, the first more heavily reliant on livestock than the second, which

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\(^1\) Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal

\(^2\) Profile reports of all the livelihood zones are available separately, looking at the data for each zone individually.

\(^3\) There was no pastoral nomad zone, although in previous HEA surveys one such zone has been covered by Oxfam UK in Gao region of Mali and another two in Mauritania by SCUK.
in turn are in some degree more self-sufficient in staple crops as well as tending towards cash crop production where possible. But other distinguishing factors are also in play between the zones, varying from the presence of irrigation to relative dependence on income from migration for work.

The district livelihood zones surveyed were:4

**SENEGAL:**

**Tambacounda – Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Zone.** This is an area towards the south of the sahelian belt, with rainfall around 600mm per annum on average. It has long been known as one of Senegal’s major groundnut-producing areas, while cotton is the second cash crop. Cash crops cover around one-third of the cultivated land, and the rest is very largely given over to staple crops: millet has marginally taken over from sorghum as the biggest crop in the last twenty years, and substantial amounts of maize are grown too. Ethnic differences amongst the population find the Wolofs and Mandingos concentrating most on crop production and the resident Fulani (*Peulh*), though settled, emphasizing herding, especially of cattle. The survey sought to give a balanced agro-pastoral picture. But livelihoods depend on more than primary production, and two other sources of income are important, especially for the poorer households: selling firewood and charcoal and cut fodder grasses gives them some two-thirds of their total cash income, and earnings from local and migrant work forms much of the rest.

**Matam – Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Zone.** Although it lies in the northern part of the same general ecological zone as Tambacounda, the economy of this area is substantially different. The villages surveyed lay mainly in the *Dieri* strip, away from the Senegal River to the east but still to some extent using land in the riverine flood-retreat cultivation area of the *Walo* strip. There is a relatively arid rainfall regime of 300-500mm per annum, but this does not entirely explain why staple cereals production, with millet dominant, furnishes an unusually small part of household food consumption for wealthier and poorer households alike, and why the market is therefore overwhelmingly the source of supply. The most particular feature of this population is their dependence on cash remittances from family members settled and working abroad, often for decades. This is a very long-standing phenomenon, one might say a tradition, amongst several populations along the Senegal River. The effect is to skew the economy towards commerce and substantial investment in cattle for the wealthier (who receive most of the remittances) and labour and services for these provided by the poorer. In this way there is in effect a redistribution of remittance money which puts the poorer households as well as the wealthier households at an income level far above their fellows in any other of the zones surveyed.

**NIGER:**

**Ouallam – Agro-pastoral Zone with strong work outmigration (exode).** This is the most western of several locations across semi-arid Niger where the very label given on the national livelihood zones map indicates a specially large element of work out-migration. But it is not the same as in Matam above: the phenomenon may be of long standing, but the cash income from remittances or money brought back is overall far more modest. Also, while there are certainly families with long-term migrants abroad, amongst the poorer households especially there is far more dependence on seasonal work migration for some weeks or months after the main local harvest, whether to urban areas in Niger or to neighbouring countries to the south, notably Nigeria. It is not necessary to look for cultural reasons: infertile soils and relatively low rainfall limit cereals production so that this is an area in deficit almost every year; but it is the high incidence of rain failures from one year to the next that contributes especially to food insecurity.

**Maïné-Soroa – Agro-pastoral Zone with ‘cuvettes’ (small natural basins filled by the underground aquifer).** Lying in the far south-east of the country, with sandy soils and dune formations, this is amongst the most arid environments where cereals agriculture is practiced in Niger. The oasis-like cuvettes are a particular

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4 In each country the livelihood zones are identified according to national livelihood zones maps already developed: in Senegal by the Ministry of Agriculture (AGVSAN) with WFP; in the other countries by FEWS NET in association with government partners.
local phenomenon, allowing some irrigated market gardening and dates production. But this does not give more than about 10% of income. It is livestock that are the mainstay for the wealthier households, especially cattle, which in turn bring the financial capital for trading as a second source of income. For the poorer households neither the ‘agro’ nor the ‘pastoral’ offers much of a livelihoods base, and the cash for food and other essentials comes from different kinds of work: employment on the fields of wealthier neighbours; cutting and selling firewood and fodder grasses and surface mining of local natron-salt resources; and seasonal work migration, to the irrigated cultivation area at the frontier with Nigeria and to Nigeria itself. The period referred to in the survey began with a particularly poor harvest, following upon several other poor years. Substantial food relief had been distributed.

**Madarounfa – South Agricultural Zone with dry season (contre-saison) irrigation.** This is one of many locations near the long southern border with Nigeria where the water table produces surface water seasonally that allows substantial irrigated agriculture, most famously of onions, but in this particular area of tobacco together with market gardening. Nevertheless, the greater part of land cultivated is only rainfed, and here sorghum and millet dominate, with intercropped cowpeas (niébe) and some patches of groundnuts. Only the Better Off 10% of households hold more than one hectare of irrigable land, although the great majority of other households do gain some income from tobacco, however modest. For the Middle and Better Off third of households, livestock income overall rivals agricultural income, although the local peculiarity is for fattening oxen for sale rather than holding herds of cattle. For the Poor and Very Poor, on the other hand, the chief income is from local agricultural employment, brick-making and petty trade in this very active market area influenced by close proximity to Nigeria, which also beckons migrant workers.

**Mali:**

**Niono – Irrigated Agriculture Zone (Office du Niger).** This zone comprizes the officially-managed irrigation scheme on the flood plain of the River Niger where individual farmers from all wealth groups cultivate parcels of rice paddy both for consumption and sale. However poorer farmers only cultivate a fraction of the paddy area cultivated by wealthier farmers because they cannot afford the inputs and the hire of labour – indeed they hire themselves out as labour. Rice is a high-value crop in Mali compared to millet or sorghum, and farmers typically sell the greater part of the rice they produce. Most farmers also cultivate a certain amount of rainfed land outside the scheme borders, growing staple millet and sorghum with cowpeas. For poorer farmers the rice and other cereals put aside for home consumption do not nearly meet the year’s requirement, but it is clearly more profitable to sell rice and buy the cheaper staples on the market. Sale of crops (essentially rice) forms a far larger proportion of household income than in any other of the zones surveyed; but livestock earnings are proportionately far smaller for the wealthier households than is the case for their fellows in the other zones. In the agricultural off-season members of households from all wealth groups typically go for migrant work elsewhere in Mali or in neighbouring countries, although the tendency is for migrants from wealthier households to have the capital to undertake trading activities rather than the agricultural or portering or construction labour pursued by poorer people.

**Bandiagara – Dogon Plateau Agricultural Zone.** This part of central Mali is an area of rugged, rocky terrain, where villages perched picturesquely on promontories in cliffs have long attracted tourists. It is in fact a harsh environment for farming, with thin topsoils and very variable rainfall. But the farmers generally manage to produce a substantial part of their annual staples requirement, even if the poorer farmers depend more on the market than on their harvest. In addition, by dint of micro-dams and sometimes transported soil, most households have at least some market garden activity lasting through the cool part of the dry season, and the area is particularly known for marketing high-quality shallots which give even the poorer households nearly one-quarter of their total annual cash income. But somewhat more comes from migrant work. Possibilities for keeping livestock are limited, but wealthier households do hold up to about a dozen cattle, sending them for seasonal far grazing by arrangement with Fulani (Peulh) herders. Livestock sales give them around one-third of their annual income. Overall, this is a zone of food insecurity and comparatively low incomes.
Burkina Faso: Sanmemtenga – Central Plateau Agriculture Zone. This is a relatively densely populated zone of Burkina Faso, with a mean annual rainfall of 600-700mm which is in principle sufficient for satisfactory production of sorghum and millet, and groundnuts and sesame as cash crops. But quite frequent rainfall irregularities combined with pressure on the land periodically bring many households to the threshold of food insecurity. On the other hand, farmers are enterprising in trying to add value to their work, and in particular they exploit any possibility, however small, to conserve groundwater for market gardening, which across the wealth groups gives 20-30% of annual cash income, helped by reasonably good road access to urban markets. In the case of livestock too there is a major market incentive with demand reaching beyond the capital across the national frontier into Ghana, even for the poultry that the Very Poor manage to keep. Nevertheless, households also depend on seasonal migrant work as well as remittances from kin settled in cities at home and abroad.

Seno – Agro-Pastoral Zone. This area contains a population largely of settled Fulani (Peulh) who retain their tradition and skill in cattle and smallstock herding, but have over the decades increased their dependence on millet cultivation. This has been in response to declining family livestock holdings, due to periodic drought (catastrophic in the 1970s and 1980s) but due also to the more long-term problem of expanding human populations trying to exploit non-expanding pastures. Indeed today the poorer households own at best a handful of goats and sheep, and only the Better Off 12% of households hold substantial cattle herds, although at some 25 head they are reportedly well under half the numbers herded by their grandfathers. In an acceptable year for rainfall, households produce a respectable amount of grain – up to half of the family requirement. But the rainfall regime remains risky, with some degree of failure several years in ten. On the other hand, there occur one or two years in ten of exceptionally good rainfall when crop yields are double or treble the normal. Normally, however, households make no money from selling crops. Wealthier households make one-third to one-half of their money from livestock sales, and as much from small trading, ox-cart transport and remittances from kin. Poorer households get most of their earnings from local labouring and firewood and fodder grass sales, and they also go to work seasonally in artisanal gold-mining in the region.

Setting aside their very localized particularities, these varied zones may be taken to represent between them a great part of the rural Sahel in general. Therefore the conclusions and messages we draw may be taken to have a wide geographical relevance.

Note: in the tables and graphs that follow, the zone names are shortened as follows: TAMB = Tambacounda; MATM = Matam; OUAL = Ouallam; MSOR = Mainé Soroa; MADA = Madarounfa; NION = Niono; BAND = Bandiagara; SANM = Sanmemtenga; (SENO = Seno).

3. Poverty and wealth: points of similarity, points of difference

The HEA methodology takes the livelihood zone as the unit of geographical reference, and the household as the economic unit of reference within the zone, since it is the basic unit of production and consumption. Much analysis then concerns differences in wealth between households. Livelihoods in rural zones are more homogeneous than in urban settings in the sense that there are fewer kinds of occupation; but in virtually any village or pastoral encampment there are very wide differences in levels of asset ownership, production and income – and by extension in food security. There is a gradation from poorer to wealthier, but not necessarily a smooth one; for analytical purposes it is enlightening to look at livelihood patterns shared by households at different general levels of wealth, i.e. to look at wealth groups. In HEA the division is usually into four wealth groups: Very Poor, Poor, Middle and Better Off. To establish this division, local criteria determined by villagers are sought at each survey point, and the terms in the local language for Very Poor etc. are ascertained.
One tendency in the Sahel generally is for poorer households to have fewer members than wealthier households. This often reflects the fact that wealthier households tend to be polygamous, so that the household unit is composed of more than one ‘nuclear family’. There is also a tendency for poorer households to have fewer able-bodied members to produce and to gain income, that is, a higher ratio of non-working children or aged members to producers/income earners (a high dependency ratio). The rule is by no means absolute, but the phenomenon was strongly reflected in the survey data. This can in one sense be misleading: for instance the proportion of Very Poor households in a village may be 25% and the proportion of Better Off households may be 12%. But if the Very Poor households have on average 7 members while the Better Off households have 20, then the proportion of the total population represented by these wealth groups is likely to be very different (taking the other wealth groups into account): the Very Poor might be 15% of the population, and the Better Off 20%.

Another consideration is that differences in wealth will look different by household and per capita. Thus in a given instance Poor households may typically cultivate 2 hectares of land and Better Off households 8 hectares, a big difference. But if the Poor household has 8 members and the Better Off household 20, then per capita the difference is diminished: the Poor household cultivates 0.25 hectares per member while the Better Off household cultivates 0.4 hectares per member. On the other hand, the grain harvest of the Better Off household is likely to be greater than that of the Poor household by a ratio of more than 4:2.5. The Better Off farmer may have better quality land; he may purchase better quality seed; he may have a better-fertilized field because he has manure from his cattle while the Poor farmer has no cattle, or he may buy chemical fertilizer or other inputs that the Poor farmer cannot afford; and he may hire labour for optimum tilling and weeding. The Poor farmer by contrast may lack sufficient family labour and will almost certainly not afford to hire workers – he may even do less work on his own field because he is one of the workers hired by the Better Off farmer.

The following table shows the wealth breakdown in the zones studied by proportion of households and by proportion of the total population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Very Poor % HH</th>
<th>Very Poor % POP</th>
<th>Poor % HH</th>
<th>Poor % POP</th>
<th>Middle % HH</th>
<th>Middle % POP</th>
<th>Better Off % HH</th>
<th>Better Off % POP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TAMB</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATM</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUAL</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSOR</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>MADA</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NION</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAND</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANM</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENO</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcomes depend, of course, on the values for Poor and Middle as well as Very Poor and Better Off; but the influence of small Very Poor households versus large Better Off households is clear across all the zones. However, we should be cautious in looking for direct messages from these data by themselves. For instance it is tempting to try to judge which areas are richer and which poorer by looking at the proportion of Very Poor and Better Off; but in fact no clear picture emerges. As we shall see in the next section, in terms of people’s cash income Matam (Senegal) and Niono (Mali) stand out as the richest for all wealth groups, while Bandiagara (Mali) and Seno (Burkina) are the poorest. Yet this is not regularly indicated by greater or lesser
proportions of Very Poor and Better Off: Bandiagara does have a relatively large proportion of Very Poor but Seno doesn’t; Niono does have relatively few Very Poor and relatively many Better Off, but Matam has substantial numbers of Very Poor and relatively few Better Off. Again, Very Poor households in Matam earn more cash in a year than Better Off households in Seno; however in Seno the Better Off, with their pastoral culture, conserve their wealth in their substantial cattle herds and only sell livestock for bare necessities. Each zone has its own particular factors that impinge on the wealth breakdown, and that is after all the reason for identifying and studying separate zones.

On the other hand, Table 2 below does show some very strong common elements between the zones. Here the wealth group comparisons are calculated by population rather than by household.

Table 2. Proportion (%) of total land cultivated, and of total cattle and sheep & goats (shoats) owned, by poorer and wealthier groups by zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>% of pop VP &amp; P</th>
<th>% of pop M &amp; BO</th>
<th>% of land VP &amp; P</th>
<th>% land M &amp; BO</th>
<th>% cattle VP &amp; P</th>
<th>% cattle M &amp; BO</th>
<th>% shoats VP &amp; P</th>
<th>% shoats M &amp; BO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TAMB</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATM</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUAL</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
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<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NION</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAND</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANM</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENO</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rural populations in the Sahel are basically primary producers of crops and livestock, both on their own account and by labouring or herding for others. They also engage in other economic activities, from selling firewood to trading; but getting a living directly from soil and pasture is paramount. It follows that when asked the chief local determinants of wealth, villagers universally cite the extent of land cultivated and the ownership of livestock (or livestock alone in the case of pure pastoralists, not represented in these surveys).

In the table above, the first, major similarity revealed between the zones is that more or less half of the population (in a range between 45% and 57%) is amongst the two poorer wealth groups taken together, the other half amongst the wealthier. It seems that there is some kind of necessary balance here, and one influence is certainly the fact that across the board, poorer people depend on working for wealthier neighbours to a significant extent. They could not make ends meet without these earnings. It follows that if the poorer groups were to form a large majority of the population, then they would have to depend significantly on employment by a small minority of wealthier people. But the local economies do not have large, plantations or ranches owned by a few individuals capable of employing numerous workers. Even the Better Off farmers are smallholders amongst whom cultivation of more than 10 hectares is quite exceptional: they are literally better off than others but not rich in any wider national, let alone international, sense. Therefore the offer of employment, to be sustainable, must be spread amongst a good number of wealthier farmers as a proportion of the community.

The area of land cultivated differs considerably between the wealth groups per household, but less so per capita as indicated by the table. This is a significant finding. With the cultivated areas per capita, one would not expect even Better Off households to produce a large tonnage of staple cereals for the market even
where there is relatively good production. Their own consumption requirements from their harvest limit what they can market, even if in some degree they can afford to sell extra sorghum or millet and buy lesser quantities of preferred, more costly staples, notably rice. Niono is an exception: here on the irrigated rice scheme farmers sell more of their rice harvest than they consume, and the poorer households at least buy cheaper staples from the market, adding them to what millet or sorghum harvest they get from their non-irrigated holdings.

Niono and Madarounfa together stand out, in that the Middle and Better Off together hold a particularly large proportion of the cultivated land overall. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that these are the two areas where there is substantial irrigation, so that land is at a particular premium. Here the wealthier farmers have their hands on most of the irrigated land, and the poorer have to depend more on non-irrigated land in the surrounding. Elsewhere the same phenomenon is repeatedly seen on a small scale: where there is some land in moist depressions (bas-fonds or cuvettes) suitable for market gardening or a cash crop, then the tendency is for the greater part of that land to be in the hands of wealthier farmers. It is not always possible to know how these situations have come about, whether by simple inheritance or by mortgage or by influence. But on the economic side it is true, as mentioned earlier, that poorer households tend to have fewer able-bodied members and much less cash available for inputs to cultivation, and so they are considerably limited in the potential profitability of holding substantial irrigable land. They are likewise constrained in clearing and using more rainfed land where this is easily available, especially in agro-pastoral areas (although demographic pressure increasingly makes such availability exceptional).

The information on livestock ownership is the most striking of all. Across the board, very nearly all cattle is owned by the Better Off and Middle wealth groups, as well as at least three quarters of the goats and sheep. This is a crucial aspect of wealth and poverty, because cattle in particular are the essential repository of wealth – like a bank savings account for the wealthier. Poor households usually have at best only a handful of goats and sheep, and these tend to be more like a current account than a savings account: every year, especially in the lean season (soudure), households need to sell one or two head to buy food and other necessities, and maybe later a further animal to pay back credit if the harvest is low. As a result they can rarely increase their herd size from one year to the next, and still more rarely sell enough smallstock to buy a cow, which is the common ambition in the Sahel. Again, crop residues are an important seasonal addition to pasture for cattle, and so the size of a household’s landholding – and therefore of their harvest – is a relevant factor mitigating against cattle ownership by poorer people. Very Poor households typically own only poultry, and if a sheep or goat is seen on their compound it is usually there as a loan from wealthier kin or neighbours, under a traditional system whereby they may use the milk and possibly keep half the surviving progeny, or take a share of profit on a fattened animal when it goes to market. But they, even more than their Poor neighbours, are often under great financial pressure to sell whatever animals they come to own. Otherwise, small ruminants, especially goats, require little labour to maintain, although there may be veterinary costs as well as, for instance, investment in fodder if a sheep is to be fattened to get the best price in a pre-festival market.

4. Food, income and expenditure

In Household Economy Analysis (HEA) three fundamental elements of livelihoods are looked at and related to each other: sources of basic food, sources of cash and the pattern of expenditure. This gives a rounded view of how households operate economically. Basic food is measured in terms of the fulfillment of the households’ annual calorie requirement (taken as 2100 kilocalories per person per day), and the principal question is where households get this food from. What proportion comes from their own harvest? What proportion comes from their own animals (milk and meat)? What proportion comes from wages for work that are paid directly in the form of grain – payment-in-kind (paiement en nature)? What proportion do they purchase? What proportion comes from gifts, whether from kin or from the Islamic obligation for charitable donation, the zakat?
As we shall see, purchase of food is a major element everywhere, and so the next question is: where do people get the money for this – but also for all the other basic necessities of life, whether non-staple foods such as pulses and vegetables that are essential for dietary variety and good nutrition, or non-food items from clothes to soap to the cash needed to meet the cost of sending a child to school. And so we already venture into the third subject: what actually do people spend money on, in what proportion?

**Figure 1. Comparison of sources of food by wealth group and by zone**

This set of graphs summarises a great deal of information that is discussed in detail in the separately written profiles, for each zone has its own ‘story’. Here and for the subsequent graphs, in this synthetic report only...
the most salient points of comparison can be offered. One or two preliminary explanations need to be made. The 100% represents the minimum annual requirement for households, so that where the bar does not reach 100% this means that households in that wealth group and zone were not typically able to satisfy their minimum requirement in the reference year. That is by definition food insecurity. On the other hand, where the bar goes beyond 100% this means that households had access by one means or another to more than their minimum food requirement; but they did not necessarily consume all of it. Other uses for ‘excess’ food include, for wealthier households in particular, grain used for payment-in-kind to workers, and food gifts made to other households in one way or another. For poorer people it may include food kept as an emergency stock or for sale in the months beyond the end of the reference year.

In nearly all instances in these zones, own harvest does not apparently reach the level of satisfying the whole annual requirement (then light green bar). In most instances this is indeed the case, but sometimes, at least amongst the Better Off, it is not so. If these households wished to eat only from their harvest, this would be sufficient or more than sufficient for them; but as mentioned above, they can afford to sell part of their harvest to buy some mount of preferred, more expensive basic foods that they do not produce, especially rice, but also processed food such as pasta or bread; also extra pulses that enrich their diet and make it more palatable while also providing equivalent calories to grain.

With the exception of Mainé Soroa in Niger which we consider later, the ‘food aid’ bar (light blue) represents the contribution to the household food intake for the year made by school feeding schemes (cantines scolaires), i.e. consumption by the schoolchildren of the household. What is perhaps remarkable is how highly significant this contribution is amongst poorer households in several zones. This is not because it is very large in household terms (although it guarantees an important part of the requirement of the schoolchildren themselves): it is usually around 5% or less of whole households’ calorie requirement. Rather, the reason is that poorer household’s coverage of their requirement is so marginal that without this addition they would not reach their minimum requirement. This is the case for the Very Poor and Poor in Tambacounda and the Very Poor in Matam and Sanmemtenga. It is likely that they would otherwise tend to purchase more food to avoid outright hunger; but that would have to be at the expense of other necessities, whether other food items important for the quality of diet, or the minimum amount of soap for basic hygiene, or the most basic renewal of clothing. In this way, poverty and food insecurity might be seen to be virtually synonymous.

In three other zones in the reference year the Very Poor households did not manage to reach their minimum food requirement, even with the school feeding contribution. In the case of Seno (Burkina) this is at least partly because the harvest of late 2009, at the beginning of the reference year, was poor (although not as poor as in the crisis year of 2004-2005), and the 2008 harvest was also below par, so stocks from the good harvest of 2007 would have long been consumed. However, in agro-pastoral areas such as this, annual fluctuations in rainfall performance are expected, and two poor, but not catastrophic, harvests in a row are not unusual. If Very Poor households are unable to at least obtain enough food for their minimum requirement in these circumstances, then this speaks of serious, chronic food insecurity.

In the case of Bandiagara (Mali) the relevant harvest and general conditions were considered about average, yet even with both school feeding and a relatively high level of charitable food gifts from within the community, the Very Poor were fully 5% below their minimum food requirement, and the Poor too are just below the threshold of their minimum requirement. In this case even more than for Seno, a special level of chronic food insecurity is indicated. There is a paradox here, in that for the poorer wealth groups Bandiagara shows a comparatively respectable level of crop production. The problem here is evidently the severe lack of capacity or opportunities to get enough cash earnings to make up the gap. This appears to be true also of

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5 The field data referred to a single, full reference year, describing the economy of households between October 2009 and September 2010, i.e. the most recent ‘consumption year’ from the beginning of one harvest to just before the next.
the Very Poor in Sanmemtenga (Burkina). Bandiagara has been found to be an area of Mali with particularly high levels of malnutrition as measured by anthropometry. The causes of chronic early childhood malnutrition are usually understood to be a combination of problems of health, hygiene and dietary quality and quantity; in this case we must suspect that food problems play a particularly important role.

Maïné Soroa (Niger) presents a special case in another sense, because here, unlike in the other zones, the food aid was not limited to school feeding in the reference year. The ecology and normal rainfall of the area are only marginally adequate to support crop production; but the last five years have seen repeated production failures due to poor rains as well pest attacks, and as a result special food aid has been repeatedly distributed. In the reference year SCUK and the government organised several rounds of relief food through Blanket Feeding and Targeted Free Distribution, and in the graph this is what is chiefly reflected in the ‘food aid’ bar for this zone, which amounts to nearly 20% of the overall food consumption of the Very Poor. The result is to bring the poorer households as well as the wealthier well above the 100% mark denoting minimum food requirement; but it is possible that in this zone chronic food insecurity keeps some households below 100% in any year if they do not receive some kind of official help.

However, even in Maïné Soroa in a year of substantial relief distribution, the balance of food after own harvest is not provided by food aid or local gifts or payment-in-kind. Here and in every other zone - and for any wealth group - it is purchase that very largely fills the gap (the pink bar on the graphs). The market today is not only there for the rural-urban exchange of produce and goods. Taking the zones together, the market is crucial to rural food security: it is the source of more than half of the basic food consumed by the poorer half of the rural population, as well as providing a good part of the food consumed by wealthier people, sometimes, as we have said, because they are exchanging their own grain for preferred other staples. If we look at the graphs for the Middle and Better Off, two areas stand out where these wealth groups are also dependent on the market for well over half their food. But here are two very different stories. In Maïné Soroa, it appears to be primarily the result of a particularly poor harvest for the reference year: even with relatively low yields in normal years due to the unfavourable soils and rainfall regime, one would expect wealthier households to produce at least half of their food requirement on the one-third hectare plus that they cultivate on average per household member.

In Matam production conditions are also relatively harsh, but the very low food production occurred in a reference year when rainfall had been relatively good. The fact is that for the wealthier households here crop cultivation is always a secondary consideration. There is no lack of land, but they cultivate hardly half of the area their fellows cultivate in Maïné Soroa. One reason is that this is a zone of high outmigration of young men, and so labour for hire locally is relatively scarce and expensive (and there is no cash crop to add value to the work). Secondly, by the same token, wealthier households typically receive a level of remittance from migrated kin that easily covers their food requirement as well as other necessities. Growing food (with household labour) is more a way of saving some money than a basis of their livelihood.

In most zones food-crop cultivation is the central activity. Yet for the majority of people this does not normally yield enough to avoid substantial dependence on the market. So what are the other main activities that bring in the necessary cash? Figure 2 gives us the basic answers.

Figure 2: Comparison of sources of cash income (FCFA) in the references year, by wealth group and zone
Explanation of certain of the bars is required, since there are some combinations of elements in order to avoid over-populating the graphs. ‘Employment and transfers’ (the pink bar) means for poorer people essentially cash wages earned for local casual labour on other people’s farms and/or daily labour on
construction or services in local towns; and transfers of money earned during seasonal migrant work away from the zone. For wealthier people, who are local employers rather than workers, the accent is on the transfers, which usually include a large element of remittances from family members permanently settled and working in towns elsewhere: wealthier households are more able than poorer households to send children to secondary school and sometimes further education, and that is route to permanent, salaried employment. They also engage to a greater or lesser extent in temporary work migration, although as mentioned earlier this is likely to be more in the line of trading than in the labour undertaken by poorer migrants.

‘Sale of agricultural produce’ includes staple cereals, cash-crops such as groundnuts, vouandzou (bambara nut), sesame, sugar cane and melon seed, and vegetables from market gardening. Better Off farmers, and to some extent Middle farmers too, tend to sell staple cereals as well as cash crops and garden produce. But it is rare for poorer households to sell cereals. The exception, discussed earlier, is Niono, where they are professional rice-growers. Otherwise poorer people sell small amounts of cash crops as well as garden produce if they have any. But they also quite commonly sell cowpeas, and these cannot be considered simply as a cash crop. Cowpeas are almost everywhere the chief accompaniment to cereals eaten at home, a crucial part of the quality and variety of the diet especially for poorer people who cannot afford many vegetables and mostly consume extremely little milk, let alone meat. If they sell cowpeas, when they almost never produce enough for their home consumption, this usually represents a real sacrifice in the face of financial pressure, notably the need to repay creditors at harvest time.

‘Self-employment’ usually consists mainly of cutting and selling firewood or processing it into charcoal for sale; other activities include cutting and selling fodder grasses; making and selling handicrafts – largely reed mats and basketry; mud-brick making and selling; and market-oriented activities ranging from transporting other people’s goods by ox-cart (often borrowed by a poor man from a wealthier owner who receives a share of the profit) to women making and selling doughnuts (beignets) at the weekly market. Self-employment earnings largely concern the poorer wealth groups, but there are exceptions: in Tambacounda in particular the local forest resources are such that even Better Off people are drawn into the profitable wood and charcoal selling. In Matam and Ouallam too, wealthier people engage in selling charcoal as well as the valuable fodder grasses.

Petty trade usually means very small-scale retailing in and between markets, but for Better Off people it can mean somewhat larger enterprise such as maintaining a food and small goods kiosk in the village, or even wholesale grain trading (although at a modest level compared with a professional trader). ‘Other’ generally means credit taken in the reference year.

The big pattern here is for Poor and Very Poor households to earn the bulk of their cash through work, and for the Middle and Better Off to get most of their cash through the sale of their primary production – crops and livestock. As we have seen, Matam is the exception, since the wealthier households rely overwhelmingly on remittance cash sent by household members abroad. Incomes in Maïné Soroa are not high, but they seem remarkably robust given the recent history of drought. Wealthier people are likely already to have sold off extra numbers of livestock in the recent bad years to cope with an extra need for cash, but they evidently retained enough to sell in the reference year. On the other hand, poor crop prospects and financial pressure must have reduced their employment of poorer neighbours on their fields and gardens, so that the Very Poor and Poor probably had more than usual recourse to migration for work (the pink bar).

Taking the zones together, if more than half of households live much more by earnings from employment and ‘self-employment’ than by consumption or sale of their own production, then we are very far from the subsistence type of economy that may have existed two or three generations ago. Today, villagers are more than ever before linked to a wider economy, and a great part of the wider economy is represented by urban demand: for cereals, for cash crops, for meat, for firewood, as well as for casual labour. Expanding cities are
what increasingly add value to the work of rural people. For poorer people the main link is indirect: they work for and service wealthier neighbours, and the money their patrons and customers pay them comes from responding to urban demand through the market. The link becomes direct when people go to the city or across frontiers for migrant work (a phenomenon that in many areas only began on any scale due to the catastrophic drought of 1973).

Even the remotest pastoral nomad today lives substantially by providing livestock for urban slaughter. But also in the agro-pastoral and agricultural zones studied here it is remarkable how important livestock are for those that have some to sell. Increasing urban demand has over a decade or two raised prices for livestock, even for poultry, perhaps more than for any other rural product. Taking the Middle and Better Off wealth groups together, in five of the nine zones income from livestock sales equals or exceeds income from the sale of agricultural produce (the dark green bar versus the light green bar). If we take the Middle wealth group alone, this is true of seven out of nine zones. This makes it all the more significant that livestock are so nearly exclusively owned by the wealthier groups. Yet the value of livestock means that the handful of goats and sheep owned by the Poor, even the handful of poultry owned by the Very Poor, give them sufficient income to be visible in the graphs, however small in absolute terms. For people whose overall budgets are so marginal, this addition is significant. It is not surprising that agencies have promoted projects to give poor households start-up capital in small livestock, often female-headed households short of labour capacity for crop production.

The graphs that follow on household expenditure provide for further reflection on the above information on sources of food and cash, and reveal one or two surprises.

**Figure 3. Comparison of annual expenditure (FCFA) of households by wealth group and zone in the reference year**
Given the high dependence of poorer people on the market for staples, we might have expected expenditure on basic food (the light green bar) to be highly dominant for the Very Poor and Poor. It is certainly the largest single element everywhere but in the always exceptional zones of Matam and Niono. But even for the Very Poor, basic food purchase takes up not more than half of household expenditure in all of the zones except Oualam, where it is about two-thirds. Yet we have seen that Oualam is not the only zone with food security problems. For Mainé Soroa the substantial receipt of relief food clearly reduced the need for such expenditure. But elsewhere what is striking is the competing need of other expenditure. The Very Poor and Poor do not have the assets, production or cash earnings to indulge in any luxury beyond the very minimum of hospitality that asserts their dignity as social beings. If they spend, they spend on necessities, and they do not always even cover all of these in a normal year, as the food situation of Bandiagara shows.

Here we find that the cost of the most basic living includes substantial expenditure on both non-staple food (autres aliments) and non-food household items (équipement ménager). The first includes pulses, vegetables, vegetable oil, sugar, and milk and meat if any at all is purchased. The second includes salt and condiments and tea that are not counted in food, and such everyday items as soap and matches, and kerosene for lamps, and charcoal for tea-boiling if the household doesn’t produce it. Together, these two categories of expenditure, usually on very small quantities purchased from day to day or week to week, mount up to one-quarter or even more of the total annual budget. In Matam the very high proportionate and absolute expenditure on non-staple foods indicates that remittances, and their redistribution to poorer people through payment for services, support a style of consumption that is more urban than rural. The unusual expenditure in Matam on water for human consumption by all households also has an urban feel to it; in Madarounfa the expenditure on water is by wealthier people for watering livestock. ‘Other’ covers such items as transport costs and ceremonies and is more prominent for wealthier people and in zones with higher incomes generally.

For Niono, for all the wealth groups, there is a large slice of the bar in light-mauve colour, representing expenditure on production inputs. This reflects the fact that whether you are rich or poor, profitable irrigated rice production requires an outlay for seed, chemical fertilisers, pesticides and maintenance or hire
of agricultural equipment including ploughs. Bigger producers also hire workers. But in the other zones, while Middle and Better Off farmers make significant expenditure on production inputs, Poor and Very Poor farmers spend only minimal amounts. This indicates something of a vicious cycle: they need to invest in wealth generation to get beyond the precarious threshold of basic sufficiency on which they are balanced; but other financial pressures deter them, and periodic production shocks even set them back further.

But there is one investment that they do universally make, and that is spending on educating their children, increasingly these days girls as much as boys. On the graphs this is the greater part of the total for ‘social services’ represented by the red bar. The relatively large absolute sums spent on education by poorer households in Matam reveal their appreciation that this is particularly important for the success of people migrating to rich countries for work. In other zones the proportion of total expenditure is generally small, but for poorer households on extremely tight budgets, any expenditure on something that brings little prospect of profit in the short term is remarkable. People recognize basic literacy and numeracy in the household as an advantage in daily life. But in conversation people openly express the bigger ambition: education of the young is seen as the only way out of the economic impasse in which they find themselves. Those at least who receive secondary school education are expected to find employment in town and give financial help to the village family.

5. Concluding points

In the sections above we have offered a number of separate conclusions from the synthesis of the information on how people in the different wealth groups obtain the food they eat, and how they obtain the cash essential to life and livelihood, and on their expenditure decisions. Here we draw together some key findings and their implications. The individual profiles of the areas surveyed, using the spreadsheeted baseline data, are a rich resource for considering the different zones separately and seeing how they ‘work’ from the point of view of household economy. These zones show some acute contrasts, but they do not represent the entire Sahel, and several were chosen because they were known to have food security problems and/or high rates of chronic malnutrition amongst children. Only one, Niono in Mali, could be considered as a ‘cereal basket’ area, but in this case not for the ordinary staple millet or sorghum but for the more expensive rice, essentially a cash-crop aimed at urban and rural customers who can afford it.

The synthesis of information in the previous sections highlights both contrasts and similarities between the zones and the wealth groups; but it is perhaps the similarities that are most striking. The fundamental observation is that across the different zones, wealthier households live by their production but poorer households live by their work. We may suggest that some decades ago, the differences between levels of wealth were that poorer people simply managed to subsist with the land and few livestock they owned, and had few if any savings (in harvest surplus or in cash) or investments in livestock herds or in trading, which were what distinguished the wealthier. If this was the case, the situation has greatly changed – not for the wealthy but for the poor. Today, the households identified as within the Poor and Very Poor wealth groups are distinguished by the fact that they cannot subsist on the land and with the other assets they possess. This means that although they cultivate their fields and tend such livestock as they have, their livelihoods are more predicated on what they do off their own farms – which is to earn money. Year in, year out, the great majority of poorer households buy the greater part of the food they consume from the market.

This circumstance may have been hastened by natural shocks over the years, notably droughts (there have been no civil wars in the countries in question), but we propose that it is structural. It is the result of growing populations trying to make a living directly from land resources that do not increase at the same rate, despite the progressive spread of cultivation onto former pastureland and ever nearer to the threshold where rainfall amounts and fluctuations can hardly sustain crops. In this structure we see that poorer people rarely have enough land for subsistence, and amongst them the Very Poor 15-25% of the population tend to
own no livestock at all beyond a handful of chickens. To survive is to work directly for others, or to sell them such items as firewood and mud-bricks and handicrafts. By contrast wealthier people appear to have accumulated the available resources.

Interestingly, this divide is seen least in the relative amount of land cultivated: the data show that per capita the wealthier households tend to cultivate 20-25% more land than the poorer, and in only one zone, Madarounfa in Niger, does it reach 50% (with an unusual number of landless people), while by contrast in Sanmemtenga in Burkina Faso there is hardly a difference. It is true that the quality of the land may count, especially where wealthier people hold most of the moist depression land on which dry-season market gardening is undertaken. But what seems to count more is what they are able to do with ordinary land, by having ploughing equipment where that is relevant, by affording fertilisers and pesticides and the hire of labourers for optimal tending of crops. This in particular makes for profitable investment in cash crops, which especially require these inputs.

However, the most extreme difference between wealth groups is in livestock: we have seen that the wealthier half of the population has a virtual monopoly on cattle ownership as well as owning some 75% of all sheep and goats. It is difficult to know how far the very high market value of livestock can encourage an absolute increase in livestock numbers in the zones (taking account of the usual cycle of loss in drought and herd regeneration); or at least how far it can encourage greater ownership by poorer people. Demographic pressure on cultivable land, resulting in smaller family plots, limits the volume of crops that households on average can produce, short of some kind of sustained ‘green revolution’ that is difficult to envisage for the majority of smallholders in the sahelian ecology. But the spread of cultivation also limits grazing areas, and even in agro-pastoral areas we see conflicts today between expanding, settled populations and the professional herders on whose seasonal grazing grounds or migration passages (parcours) crop cultivation has encroached. At the same time crop residues can only substitute for grazing to a strictly limited extent in the current production systems of the Sahel.

Despite the evidence of skewed production capacity and the accumulation of assets by wealthier people, it is not necessary to take a fatalistic, quasi-Malthusian view of the poor. The fact is that despite great deprivation amongst them, the populations of the rural Sahel have continued to survive and increase in number. How has this been possible? We have remarked that they have increasingly and collectively operated in a wider economy – in a wider market. The rural economy has become progressively monetized. It is the market that has allowed the poor to diversify their sources of income; it is the market that has added enough value to the crops and livestock of wealthier farmers to induce them to give the work to their poorer neighbours that in turn underpins their survival. And as we have remarked in the previous section, a great part of the demand that fuels this market lies in the urban sector: the rural economy is more than ever tied to the urban economy. It follows that as the urban population and its market demand increase, so will the value of rural products. But the benefits will be diluted if the rural population continues to double every twenty-five or thirty years.

The market may underpin rural survival, but it offers no guarantee of an escape from poverty. One general measure of rural poverty must be in its worst result: childhood malnutrition. But as we have also remarked in the previous section, the causes of childhood malnutrition are divided between environmental health and hygiene conditions on the one hand, and food access conditions on the other. The precise degree of influence of one or other factor in raised malnutrition is usually far from clear: we have pointed to the likely influence of the food side in Bandiagara’s case, but we cannot say the same for Tambacounda, where incomes are higher and absolute food access appears better, yet malnutrition is also high. But the poor of Tambacounda are still poor by any standard: the narrow margin of dietary adequacy may well play alongside other factors.
Perhaps it should suffice to conclude that regardless of the precise interplay of factors, this is the malnutrition of poverty, and in the end only the reduction of poverty will sustainably reduce the malnutrition. Insofar as government and agency interventions are ever to attack this poverty successfully, these must be founded on an understanding of how poor people operate their household economy, and how this attaches to the wider economy of which we have talked. The present surveys offer a broad window onto this arena; and there is every reason to believe that the participants in the HEA capacity-building programme have gained both the skill and the motivation to open many other windows.
Save The Children UK & The Food Economy Group
Atelier : Synthèse des résultats des enquêtes de la formation HEA au Sahel 19-22 juillet 2011 à Niamey
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Les objectifs de l’atelier

- Synthèse pour quoi faire?
- Les données ne sont pas en soi de l’information: ‘Information’ veut dire données analysées afin qu’on comprenne quelque-chose
- Qu’est-ce que l’on veut comprendre?
  - La sécurité alimentaire
  - La pauvreté
- Pour quoi faire?
  - Combattre la malnutrition
  - Améliorer l’alerte précoce
  - Mieux plannifier les interventions de développement

Le chemin d’amélioration des capacités

- Cadre d’analyse HEA
- Méthodologie et pratique du terrain
- Utilisation du tableur de données de base
- Manipulation des données pour les scénarios (LIAS)

Synthèse:

- Tirer les messages pour la sécurité alimentaire
- Tirer les messages pour le développement des moyens d’existence
- Le plaidoyer
- ‘Synthèse’ veut dire mettre ensemble, ou combiner – pour l’analyse

Les thèmes de l’agenda

- Différences et similarités dans les moyens d’existence entre les zones
- Différences entre les groupes socio-économiques: dans les zones; entre les zones
- La sécurité alimentaire et la pauvreté : qu’est qui ressort des informations HEA ?
- Les systèmes d’alerte précoce : comment insérer des éléments utiles de HEA ?
- Les résultats HEA par rapport aux problèmes du développement
- Le plaidoyer : qu’est-ce que les résultats HEA nous donnent comme arme?

Les différences et les similarités entre les zones

Mettre les données ensemble pour les comparer:
- voir les différences
- voir les similarités
- rendre visible des modèles
- trouver des surprises
- Typologie des zones
- Tambacounda:
- Matam:
- Ouallam:
- Mainé Soroa
Les différences entre les groupes socio-économiques

- On cherche à définir les points clés des différences entre les groupes:
  - dans une zone donnée
  - entre les zones.
- Les éléments à suivre

Les terres cultivées

- superficies
- qualité de sol
- à qui appartiennent les terres inondées ou les bas-fonds?
- terres empruntées/louées

Le bétail

- Le nombre de têtes de grand et de petit bétail
- Le pourcentage de grand et de petit bétail dans les mains des nantis et moyens ensemble
- Le bétail emprunté
- La contribution relative du lait dans les calories globales consommées

Les cultures

- La contribution relative des propres cultures (vivres) à la consommation globale (donc aussi la dépendance relative du marché)
- Qui profitent des cultures maraîchères?
- Qui profitent des cultures de rente?
- Les dépenses pour les intrants et pour le travail journalier
- Les équipements (charru, charrette), les boeufs de labour, les ânes
Les revenus et les dépenses
Les deux ou trois différences clés dans
• La répartition des sources de revenu
• La répartition des dépenses

Les risques/chocs
Les deux plus grandes différence dans les stratégies d’adaptation
• A noter:
  • Pour certains éléments il y a des différences assez importantes entre les quatre classes, p.e. en ce qui concerne la proportion des revenus provenante de l’emploi journalier
  • Pour certains éléments les différences sont essentiellement entre les plus pauvres (les très pauvres et les pauvres ensemble) et les plus riches (les moyens et les nantis ensemble) p.e. en ce qui concerne la propriété du bétail

La sécurité alimentaire et la pauvreté – qu’est-ce qui ressort des informations HEA?

• La sécurité alimentaire
  • Les trois piliers classiques:
    Disponibilité
    Accès
    Utilisation (absorption)
  • Nous nous concernons surtout avec l’acès, dans lequel néanmoins nous comprenons la disponibilité dans le sens de la consommation des propre cultures contre consommation par achat etc.

La pauvreté
• Notre définition n’est pas en termes absolus, ni d’après un point de référence international telle que la consommation économique au dessous d’une valeur de $X pppj, ou par rapport à un seuil de dépense de 80% des revenus sur la nourriture de base.
• Notre définition est relative et provient du village: nous avons imposé le cadre de quatre couches socio-economiques, mais c’était pour les villageois de définir les critères de differentiation

• Que voulons-nous dire par l’insécurité alimentaire?
  - Que les TP dans quelques zones n’arrivent pas normalement à consommer 100% de leur besoin minimum?
  - Que la moitié pauvre du village souffre de la soudure annuelle (même s’ils rattrapent la consommation après la moisson)? S’agit-il donc de l’insécurité alimentaire chronique?
• Ou bien, s’agit-il d’une insecurité liée aux événements ponctuels?
• c.a.d. la vulnérabilité des ménages aux aléas climatiques ou autres?
• ce qui veut dire que dans un village il y aura ceux qui sont en insécurité alimentaire, n’ayant pas les moyens de se sortir du problème ponctuel, et ceux qui ne sont pas vulnérable dans ce sens.
• Le formulaire classique de la ‘vulnérabilité’ des ménages aux chocs:
  économie du ménage (de base)
choc
+
stratégies d’adaptation
=
vulnérabilité

Points de réflexion

• Est-ce qu’une zone de moyens d’existence est automatiquement en insécurité alimentaire si elle est normalement déficitaire dans la production de vivres?
• Dans une zone donnée, est-ce que la présence de la malnutrition chronique à un taux élevé indique toujours l’insécurité alimentaire?
• Est-ce qu’il y a une différence entre l’insécurité alimentaire chronique et la pauvreté chronique?

Les tâches:
Choisissez deux de vos trois zones, l’une dans laquelle on souffre de l’insécurité alimentaire, l’autre où l’on n’y souffre pas (ou beaucoup moins). Faites une courte présentation qui répondu aux questions suivantes:

a) Est-ce que vous considérez toute une zone d’être en insécurité alimentaire? Normalement? Périodiquement? Oui ou non, expliquez
b) Pour la zone la plus touchée, indiquez les éléments parmi les données de base qui mènent à l’insécurité alimentaire pour des groupes de richesse. Pour la zone qui est moins touchée, expliquez comment les pauvres sont moins soumis à l’insécurité alimentaire.

Comparez la qualité de pauvreté dans les deux zones, tenant compte non seulement des biens des groupes mais aussi des conditions naturelles, de géographie et de commerce

• Est-ce qu’il s’agit des mêmes éléments pour les deux zones?
• Entre les deux zones qu’est-ce qui fait la différence dans la qualité et/ou dans le degré de pauvreté?

Comparez la qualité de richesse dans les deux zones, tenant compte non seulement des biens des groupes mais aussi des conditions naturelles, de géographie et de commerce

• Est-ce qu’il s’agit des mêmes éléments?
• Qu’est-ce qui fait la différence dans la qualité et/ou dans le degré de richesse dans les deux zones?

Les systèmes nationaux d’alerte précoce:
comment insérer des éléments utiles de HEA?

• Le défi
• Est-ce qu’on peut utiliser la base de données HEA séléctivement pour contribuer au système d’alerte précoce?
• Ou bien utilisation du HEA pour l’alerte précoce nécessite-t’il l’adoption du cadre HEA comme base d’analyse du SAP? (p.e. pour les scénarios)
• est-ce qu’il faut avoir une base de données HEA couvrante toutes les zones de moyens d’existence du pays pour permettre l’utilisation de n’importe quelle variable HEA ?
• Les points forts de HEA
• le calendrier saisonnier des activités de la production et de l’échange
• l’analyse par rapport aux groupes socio-économiques
• les trois piliers:
  - sources de nourriture
  - sources de revenu
  - les dépenses
• La compréhension énumérée et globale des opérations économiques des ménages qui combine tous ces éléments
• La capacité d’élaborer des scénarios prédictifs énumérés

INDICATEURS D’ALERTE DU SAP/BURKINA

1. Bilan céréalier déficitaire
2. Hausse des prix des céréales par rapport à la moyenne des 5 dernières années à la même période
3. Taux de sous-nutrition aiguë
4. Bilan fourrager déficitaire
5. Termes de l’échange bétail/céréales
   6. Taux de couverture des besoins en céréales (novembre)
7. Nombre de repas par jour
8. Exode
9. Taux de décapitalisation

La tâche
• Divisez-vous par pays
• Vérifiez / modifiez la liste d’indicateurs par rapport à ceux qui sont suivis par le SAP (ou équivalent) de votre pays
• Imaginez que vous devez plaidoyer l’utilisation des éléments HEA dans le SAP. Construisez un argument pour l’appui des données HEA par rapport aux indicateurs SAP. Illustrez votre argument avec des exemples de l’utilisation des données pour une zone.

Les résultats HEA par rapport aux problèmes du développement

• Le rapport entre l’analyse HEA et le développement
• Le HEA fut crée pour aider à apprécier la situation alimentaire aux moments de crise.
• Mais il est carrément basé sur l’analyse des moyens d’existence du ménage quotidiens. Il explique en grand détail comment les villageois se débrouillent normalement – hors crise.
• Il s’ensuit que la base de données de base HEA devraient s’appliquer aussi au problèmes de développement – car plus on comprend l’opération normale du ménage, plus on peut planifier sagement.
• Quelques éléments pertinents de HEA
• La division en groupes de richesse en toute matière
• Notamment la distinction entre les pauvres et les très pauvres qui peut révéler des différences très importantes pour les investissements du développement.
• L’analyse de la dépendance normale des ménages sur l’autoconsommation et sur le marché à vivres.
• L’importance relative du bétail dans les revenus
• L’importance du travail journalier et pour la productivité des plus riches et pour la survie des plus pauvres
• Comme nous avons une base de données globale sur l’économie des ménages, nous pouvons réfléchir sur les contraintes et les opportunités pour l’acroissement de richesse.
• La question fondamentale: si ce n’est pas la paresse, qu’est-ce qui empêche les plus pauvres à atteindre un meilleur niveau?

La tâche
1. D’après les données HEA, faites des observations brèves sur les contraintes économiques des plus pauvres d’une zone choisie. Qu’est-ce qui leur empêche de s’en sortir de la pauvreté?
2. Est-ce qu’il y a des solutions auxquelles l’aide du développement pourrait au moins contribuer?

Des points de référence suggérés
• la terre
• le bétail
• les ressources naturelles (cueillette d’aliments, bois de chauffe)
• l’emploi
• le commerce
• l’éducation
• la santé
• des éléments éventuels socio-culturels
• les effets durables des chocs
• .......
• .......
• .......

Le plaidoyer

• Points-clés du plaidoyer
  Le plaidoyer n’est ni un compte rendu ni un séminaire - le plaidoyer est la livraison d’un message
  Il faut être surtout bref, incisif et persuasif
  La question que vous devez avoir en tête est: “Que va l’auditeur d’aujourd’hui se rappeler demain de ce que j’ai dit?”

Conseils
• Etre bref est plus difficile que d’être long
• Le sujet est complexe mais l’explication doit être limitée à essentielles
• Il faut être simple dans ce sens – mais jamais simpliste ou grossier: on n’est pas politicien!
Il ne faut pas essayer d’introduire trop de sujets ou d’informations: commencez votre préparation par l’identification des deux ou trois messages que vous voulez communiquer. Ensuite, identifiez les informations cruciales pour faire le point.

Vous avez des données chiffrées à proposer. Cela est un acquis de HEA. Mais il faut être très sélectif: pour le plaidoyer, deux chiffres sont plus puissants que vingt. Un graphique simple vaut mieux qu’un tableau de chiffres.

**Proposition d’un plan de présentation:**
- introduire le sujet – pourquoi est-ce important?
- donner un petit contexte: p.e. “X et Y sont essentiellement la façon de survie des pauvres, et aujourd’hui je veux me concentrer sur Z élément crucial”
- indiquer une ou deux informations frappantes –celles que l’audience ne savait pas, surtout celles qui vont contre les suppositions probables de l’audience
- donner votre argument brèvement
- affirmer votre message.

**La tâche**
- Construire une présentation pas plus que cinq diapos pour un plaidoyer sur un sujet au choix.

**Proposition des thèmes:**
- Le HEA peut donner des aperçus importants sur la malnutrition chronique
- Pour aider la production agricole, il faut bien comprendre les contraintes des plus pauvres
- Il faut mettre plus l’accent sur l’aide au secteur bétail
- Pour bien planifier l’aide au développement destinée aux plus pauvres, il faut faire la distinction entre les ‘pauvres’ et les ‘très pauvres’
- Dans les stratégies officielles pour la protection de l’environnement il faut tenir compte de l’importance de la collecte de bois et des produits sauvages pour la survie des pauvres.
- Il serait très souhaitable d’utiliser les résultats HEA dans les systèmes SAP